

## On the Gains from Tradable Benefits-in-kind: Evidence for Workfare in India

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Widely-used in-kind benefits are often rationed across potential participants in social programmes. This poses an operational challenge in implementation with limited public information. One possible solution is to randomize assignment given the available information. However, as this paper shows, neither the purposive targeting of in-kind benefits nor randomized assignment is likely to yield a competitive equilibrium given private information on diverse personal gains. The paper characterizes equilibrium assignments and the implications for policy and evaluation. The theory is applied to an antipoverty programme providing rationed jobs on rural public works in a poor state of India. Special-purpose survey data reveal large unexploited gains from allowing tradable assignments. The paper shows that the potential gains exceed those from poverty targeting and stylized cash transfer options. Realizing the scope for poverty reduction by such means will undoubtedly require complementary efforts in reducing the influence of other market and institutional factors creating poverty in the first place, including inequalities in access to credit and knowledge.

### INTRODUCTION

In-kind benefits have long been popular in social policy-making.<sup>1</sup> A common problem faced is how a limited number of such benefits-in-kind (BIKs) is to be assigned across a designated set of eligible individuals, not all of whom can be served. Presumably, the decision-maker cares about the aggregate disbursement of the BIKs but also cares about the welfare gains, and those gains undoubtedly vary. Thus the interhousehold allocation of BIKs matters.

With information about the gains to all individuals, one could simply target the BIKs accordingly, with the first one going to those with highest gains, and so on until the available stock is exhausted. What makes the problem difficult in practice is that how the gains differ is in large part unknown to the decision-maker, although the personal gains may be known reasonably well at the individual level.

Two examples illustrate the problem. For the first, consider a training programme with only so many slots available. The wage gains from training vary. Some plausible covariates of the gains may be observable, but some crucial ones—such as latent ability—are not, although one can expect these variables to be reasonably well-known privately. The policy problem is how to allocate the limited number of slots, with little or no information about the individual gains.

The second example is a workfare scheme, providing extra work at a wage rate common to all. Here the BIK is the extra work. If anyone who wants this work can get it, then the private information will be revealed, with no administrative assignment required. That will not be the case, however, if not all those who want work can be accommodated and the gains to individuals joining the programme vary, given differing forgone earnings from other available work (including self-employment). While each person probably has a fairly good idea of their best alternative at the time, this is not known to the decision-maker in deciding how to ration the available jobs.

Administrative assignments have tended to rely on various proxies for the likely gains. The available evidence to date does not suggest that such targeting efforts are very good

in practice.<sup>2</sup> The information problem looms large. In both the examples above (and other similar cases), the initial administrative assignment of BIKs is unlikely to be an equilibrium. There will be incentives for trade based on the private information about the individual gains, to the extent that some have larger gains than others. At the competitive market price, such trades will tend to reallocate the BIKs toward those with larger gains, thus increasing the aggregate impact of the social policy.

We know very little about the potential gains from tradable benefits-in-kind. This is not surprising given that individual gains from trade are typically unobserved, including by researchers. This has made it hard to inform public discussion of the arguments for and against the frequent efforts by policymakers to restrict trade in assignments for in-kind benefits—indeed, re-sale is often explicitly forbidden, at least on paper. The information asymmetry also underlies the lack of evidence on the extent to which informal trades (outside administrative purview) can realize the aggregate gains in practice. When one person receives a BIK that has greater value to a non-recipient, the two parties may well be able to make a mutually beneficial trade, whether legal or not. Then we may find that there are only small differences in the remaining gains across the eligible population, such that the further trade brings little extra benefit; similarly, there may be little welfare cost to governmental rules aiming to restrict trade. This is no more than a conjecture, however; we may instead find that (governmental or other) restrictions on trade come with a high cost. We do not know. The knowledge gap exists for the same reason that it is a concern.

The lack of empirical knowledge has left much scope for debate. A common objection to market-like solutions in social policy design is that the gains may be captured disproportionately by the well-off. By this view, tradable BIKs may bring less benefit to initially excluded poor people. Weitzman (1977) shows that the gains from a market-based allocation mechanism depend on how much individual gains differ *and* on the extent of income inequality. If one judges that incomes are too unequally distributed, then one can also be concerned that a market mechanism for social programmes will only make things worse. Yet the literature provides counterarguments. Sah (1987) demonstrates that for poor people, allowing rationed BIKs to be tradable (which he calls ‘convertible rations’) can dominate the other allocation mechanisms that he considers. Furthermore, Che *et al.* (2013) show that a competitive market allocation for an assignable good can attain higher utilitarian social welfare if it is introduced in the wake of an initially random assignment.

Recognizing the concern that a quasi-market assignment runs the risk of being captured by the non-poor, this paper studies the properties and performance of the Che *et al.* (2013) ‘randomization-with-resale’ assignment mechanism when the welfare outcomes are to be judged by the pecuniary gains to poor people. The paper characterizes the competitive equilibrium of assignments to a programme following initial randomization across a set of eligible people. This is the allocation that we would observe if those eligible could freely trade. The model is key to the empirical analysis of the costs of restricting trade in BIKs. The model also carries some implications for the interpretation of randomized controlled trials (RCTs).

Based on this model, the paper simulates equilibrium allocations using a sample of surveyed workers in a large antipoverty programme in rural Bihar, India. This is a setting that is well-suited for a case study of the potential for allowing tradable BIKs. The programme provides low-wage, unskilled, jobs on rural public works projects, assigned through local administrative processes. There is survey-based evidence in this setting that a sizeable share of those who say that they want work on the scheme do not get that work. Possibly what people say in a survey differs from what they do in reality. Or possibly there are

adequate informal mechanisms within villages to ensure that the available work goes to those who would gain the most. The extent of the unexploited efficiency gains remains unclear.

The task of the paper is to assess whether the gains from trade among participants have been realized in practice. This requires rather unusual data. The data studied here provide a unique (to my knowledge) opportunity for addressing this issue, given that a plausible measure of the personal gains can be retrieved using survey data. The sample is treated as the universe from which artificial programmes are simulated, consistently with the predictions of the theoretical model. The simulations are used to estimate the participant's mean monetary gains from trade, beyond what has been attained already, legally or otherwise. Various counterfactuals are considered, including a 'needs-based' assignment, based on household consumption expenditure per person, as widely used for measuring poverty in India.

This is also a setting in which we can learn about how the potential gains from trade (if any are revealed) are distributed. The data come from a population of poor households; indeed, 75% come from families living below the World Bank's international poverty line, which identified about 15% of the world's population as poor at the same time. However, they are not all equally poor—indeed, the inequality in household consumption per person is similar to rural India as a whole. Gender inequality is also an issue. The paper looks at heterogeneity along both household consumption and gender dimensions.

It should be emphasized that the evidence presented here is for one specific type of in-kind benefit, in one specific setting. It may well be the case that providing jobs as a means of reducing poverty in poor areas of rural India is a situation in which the gains from trade are likely to vary a lot, pointing to large costs of impediments to trade. Would that also be true for other in-kind benefits, such as when food rations are targeted to poor families? For some, the ration is no more food than wanted, given their food demand functions, but for others it is more than they want. Thus the value of this BIK varies. It might be conjectured that this type of variation is not as great as that associated with a workfare scheme. That is a conjecture, however. Cunha (2014) finds substantial variation in the extent to which in-kind food rations are infra-marginal in data for a Mexican 'food BIK' programme.

The next section provides the model of equilibrium assignments, which carries the key insights needed for the empirical analysis. Section II applies the model to the survey data for workers on the public works scheme. Trade shifts the available jobs towards those with lower forgone earnings from other work opportunities. The paper's empirical results indicate large unexploited gains from trade. In equilibrium, tradable assignments would increase the scheme's aggregate gains by a factor of 2 to 3. Similar gains are found when the comparison is with the needs-based assignment. The equilibrium assignment yields large gains to both workers from poor families and female workers. Tradable BIKs can also have greater impact on poverty than feasible policy options for cash transfers. Section III identifies some potential impediments to realizing the gains in practice. The impediments relate to deeper features of the market and institutional/governmental environment that can be thought of as being among the reasons why poverty exists in this setting. Complementary policies are identified that may be necessary to realize the potential gains to poor people from tradable BIKs. Section IV concludes.

## I. THE EQUILIBRIUM WITH TRADABLE ASSIGNMENTS

A lumpy BIK is to be assigned across a predetermined set of eligible recipients when there is not enough for everyone in that set. It is assumed that the BIKs are provided free of charge

and that resale (if feasible) is costless. The nature of the BIK is such that nobody would want a second, and it cannot be stored for later use.

Let  $D_i = 1$  if individual  $i = 1, \dots, n$  (with  $n$  fixed) receives the BIK initially, while  $D_i = 0$  if not, with mean  $\bar{D} \equiv E(D)$ , which we can call the *coverage rate*. There are both BIK recipients and non-recipients, so  $0 < \bar{D} < 1$ . There is a fixed number ( $n\bar{D}$ ) of BIKs available (as determined by the budget), so  $\bar{D}$  is exogenous. Using the (Neyman–Rubin) potential outcomes framework, whether or not an individual actually receives the BIK, one can define two numbers for all  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , namely the outcome with the BIK,  $Y_{i1}$ , and that in its absence,  $Y_{i0}$ .<sup>3</sup> The gain is  $G_i \equiv Y_{i1} - Y_{i0}$ , with cumulative distribution function  $F(\cdot)$  and mean  $E(G)$ . When it helps to simplify the analysis,  $G$  is treated as a continuous variable with a (strictly increasing) distribution function on the support  $[G^{\min}, G^{\max}]$ .

In the literature on the standard ‘evaluation problem’ the main task is usually to estimate the mean gain  $E(G)$  (or a conditional mean of interest, such as  $E(G|D = 1)$ ). No attempt is made to estimate the individual gains. The classic RCT randomly assigns the treatment and compares mean outcomes for those treated and those not. As is well-known, under standard assumptions (including that there are no spillover effects, contaminating the controls), randomized assignment delivers an unbiased estimate of the mean gain (though, of course, any one trial will contain an experimental error).

Here we address a different problem: how should the programme be assigned to maximize mean gain? Call this the ‘assignment problem’. With perfect information, the solution is obvious: give the first BIK to the individual with  $G^{\max}$ , then give the next to the next highest, and continue until all the available BIKs have been allocated. Of course, information is far from perfect (as discussed in the Introduction). The individual gains are typically unknown to the decision-maker, given the obvious difficulty in knowing outcomes in two different states of nature at the same time. However, each person clearly knows a lot more about his or her own likely gain. Indeed, in some settings (including the examples in the Introduction), it can be expected that each individual is reasonably well-informed about the  $G_i$ , and acts accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

### *The competitive equilibrium*

Trade will clearly change the assignments in an economically relevant way. Those who were assigned a BIK can sell it at a price  $P$ . Given that the personal gain from the programme is known to each person, the sellers will be those who receive the programme initially but for whom  $G_i < P$ ; they do better by selling it than keeping it. Buyers will be those who did not receive it initially, but with  $G_i > P$ .

When the decision-maker knows nothing about the individual gains, a random (uniform in probability) assignment within the eligible set has obvious appeal. Initial randomization justifies assuming that the distribution of gains is the same for those who are initially assigned the programme and those who are not. The share of the population that received the BIK and want to sell at the price  $P$  is  $\bar{D} \cdot F(P)$ . The corresponding share who did not receive the BIK but want to buy an assignment at price  $P$  is  $(1 - \bar{D})(1 - F(P))$ . Let us further assume that  $F(G^{\min}) < 1 - \bar{D}$ . (A sufficient condition for this to hold is that  $F(G^{\min}) = 0$ , but a point mass at  $G^{\min}$  is also allowed.) Then there is a positive excess demand for assignments at  $G^{\min}$ . By definition,  $F(G^{\max}) = 1$ , so there must be a positive excess supply at  $G^{\max}$ . Then, by continuity of  $F(\cdot)$ , a unique equilibrium exists.<sup>5</sup> The market clearing price solves  $F(P) = 1 - \bar{D}$ , that is, the equilibrium price is the quantile of gains corresponding to the share of the population not receiving a BIK ( $P = F^{-1}(1 - \bar{D})$ ).

There are four groups of people in this model. .

1. The keepers: those assigned the BIK who do not want to sell it ( $G_i > P$ ). The proportion of the population who are keepers is  $\bar{D}(1 - F(P)) = \bar{D}^2$  (in equilibrium), and their mean gain is  $E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i > P)$ .
2. The sellers: those selected initially who would rather sell their assignment ( $G_i < P$ ). Their population share is  $\bar{D}(1 - \bar{D})$  in equilibrium, with mean gain  $P$ .
3. The buyers: those initially excluded who expect a net benefit from buying access ( $G_i > P$ ). Their population share is  $\bar{D}(1 - \bar{D})$  (in equilibrium), and their mean gain is  $E(G_i|D_i = 0, G_i > P) - P$ .
4. The rest, with population share  $(1 - \bar{D})F(P)$  and zero gain.

Notice that in equilibrium, the share of the population participating in the market ( $2\bar{D}(1 - \bar{D})$ ) does not depend on the distribution of the gains; the price does all the adjustment, given  $\bar{D}$ . Differences in that distribution do, of course, matter to the size of the aggregate gains from tradable assignments.

Summing the gains across all four groups, weighted by population shares, the total gain per capita of the population is<sup>6</sup>

$$(1) \quad E(G_i) = \bar{D}^2 E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i > P) + \bar{D}(1 - \bar{D}) \\ \times E(G_i|D_i = 0, G_i > P) = \bar{D} E(G_i|G_i > P).$$

The first term on the right-hand side is the gain to keepers, while the second term is the gain to the traders (the gain to sellers plus that to buyers).

Trade improves on the initial randomized assignment since the gains to those who buy an assignment ( $E(G_i|D_i = 0, G_i > P)$ ) must exceed the gains to those who sell one ( $E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i < P)$ ).<sup>7</sup> Consider the maximum attainable aggregate gain with perfect information. For that allocation, there will be some threshold gain,  $Z$ , above which everyone receives the BIK, and below which no one receives it. ( $Z$  is determined by the number of BIKs available.) The mean gain is  $E(G_i|G_i > Z)$ , and  $1 - F(Z) = \bar{D}$ , which implies that  $Z = P$ , giving the same mean gain as the market equilibrium attains after the initial randomized assignment. Thus, despite the decision-maker knowing nothing about individual gains, the trade-based assignment mechanism attains the first-best optimum with perfect information.

A further comparison of interest is with the expected gain *without* trade, as given by  $\bar{D} E(G_i|D_i = 1)$ , which is the mean gain that we would estimate using an RCT under standard assumptions (including no trade in assignments). The gain (per capita) from trade is then  $\bar{D}(1 - \bar{D}) [E(G_i|D_i = 0, G_i > P) - E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i < P)] > 0$  (invoking randomization).

### Three remarks

First, the above model can be adapted readily to allow stratification by categories of individuals defined by observed characteristics, taken as fixed. For example, this may be based on gender or a poverty map (showing poverty measures by area). Then the value of  $\bar{D}$  varies by group, yielding different (group-specific) prices. The policy goal can then be thought of as maximizing aggregate gains for each category, which then assures a maximum of any fixed-weighted aggregate gain (given the partition into groups).

Second, the equilibrium assignment using tradable BIKs does not have any obvious equivalence to a feasible cash-only transfer policy. The final assignment of the gains from tradable BIKs will not (in general) be the same as for a cash-only policy since (of course) there will be no incentive to trade cash transfers; in contrast, trade in BIKs can be expected

to modify the initial assignment. Nor would it be reasonable to argue that with purposive targeting, a cash-only policy can implement the equilibrium assignment of BIKs, since that would require a different information set, which should clearly be held constant for a valid comparison. The empirical section will comment further on the implications for comparisons of cash versus in-kind antipoverty policies in that specific context.

Third, there is an implication for the interpretation of RCTs aiming to evaluate the impact of BIKs using a pilot, to inform a government's decision about scaling up. Valid inferences from the RCT cannot, of course, ignore the scope for trade in assignments, since this is a source of spillover effects. Nor would it seem likely that the pilot will be able to prevent trade in assignments, as this would require laws and the power to enforce them. Yet governments routinely prevent trade in assignments at scale, and are more likely to have the required power. So we can imagine a scenario in which there is more trade in assignments at the pilot stage than at scale. Assuming that the mean gain is calculated correctly in the RCT (allowing for trade), the RCT will tend to overestimate the impact of the scaled-up programme, given that the gains from trade are lost on scaling up. The RCT will provide undue encouragement for scaling up.

This last argument assumes that the induced change in assignments is observable to the evaluator. That might not be the case. Suppose instead that the evaluator ignores the spillover effect to the control group implied by trade (as it is unobserved) and simply calculates the mean gain for those treated based on observable incomes. This calculation will also overestimate the mean gain on scaling up (without trade) since the evaluator will overestimate the gains to the sellers (attributing a gain of  $P$  per seller instead of  $E(G_i | D_i = 1, G_i < P)$ ). Again, the RCT will deliver excessive encouragement for scaling up.

## II. SIMULATING TRADE IN PUBLIC WORKS JOBS IN RURAL INDIA

The rest of this paper implements the above model for a sample of workers participating in India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). The scheme has a more-or-less explicit aim of reducing poverty by providing jobs on local small-scale public works projects at stipulated wage rates, typically set a little above prevailing wages rates for manual agricultural labour. As is often the case, requiring people to work for poverty relief is seen to have intrinsic merit. There is also a classic self-targeting argument, namely that non-poor people will not want to do such work, and nor will poor people with preferred options.<sup>8</sup>

Each household in rural India has a stipulated maximum number of days of work on the scheme, set at 100 days per year per household.<sup>9</sup> The survey data used here indicate that the 100-day limit was rarely reached. The mean number of days worked in the previous year was 17, and reached or exceeded 100 days for only 0.7% of households.<sup>10</sup>

For the purposes of this case study on tradable BIKs, we can think of this scheme as one in which jobs are made available through a locally administrated assignment mechanism. While the scheme is intended to be demand driven, in practice, local village leaders generally decide what projects are done under the scheme and who is employed. The 'guarantee' of employment is not met in practice. Indeed, there is evidence that the assignments are heavily rationed in practice, though more so in poorer states of India (Dutta *et al.* 2012, 2014; Desai *et al.* 2015). Using national survey data for 2010, Dutta *et al.* (2012) report that, for India as a whole, 44% of those rural households who say that they wanted work on the scheme did not get it. In all but three of India's 20 larger states, the reported rationing rate was over 20%.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the rationing rate tended to be higher in states with a higher poverty rate. In one of India's poorest states, Bihar, the rationing rate was 79%; barely one-in-five of those

workers who wanted work on the scheme got it. Similar rates of rationing were reported in 2020, during the pandemic (Kapoor 2020). Ravallion (2021) identifies reasons why rationing of the available jobs on MGNREGS can emerge as an equilibrium in the local political economy, and argues that the conditions for this to occur are more likely in poorer states, such as Bihar. The legislation has a provision for payment of an unemployment allowance if work cannot be provided, but such payments appear to be rare in practice (Dutta *et al.* 2014).

The scheme (implicitly) allows jobs to be transferred *within* households. A ‘job card’ for each household identifies the work provided by its members, but the 100-day limit is applied only to the total, leaving the household free to choose how the available work is assigned among its members. It is likely that families make participation decisions with the intention of increasing the net income gain to the family as a whole by assuring that extra work opportunities go to family members with lower forgone earnings. (How the gains are distributed is another matter.) This is consistent with both observations from field work (interviewing participating families) and the econometric model of intrahousehold time allocation in Datt and Ravallion (1994), using data related to an antecedent programme to MGNREGS, in the state of Maharashtra.

The scope for re-assignment *between* household is far less obvious. The legislation and operating rules of the scheme contain no provision to allow a household that does not want all of the 100 days of work to transfer the balance to another household that has reached 100 days. The 100-day limit is intended to be applied to every rural household and is supposed to be checked with reference to the job cards. As we have seen, the limit is generally not binding, and rationing of assignments is the norm. While there is no formal mechanism whereby households can trade their assignments, one cannot rule out the possibility that some form of interhousehold trade in assignments is occurring, though it is hard to observe. What is being measured here should be interpreted as the remaining, unexploited, gains from competitive interhousehold trade in assignments.

Policy discussions of this and similar schemes have often assumed (at least implicitly) that the worker has no other source of income while working on the scheme. Then the income gain is roughly uniform, and the aggregate gains from tradable assignments would be small. However, it is implausible that there is no forgone income for participants. Poor people in poor places cannot afford to be idle. For a precursor to MGNREGS, in the state of Maharashtra, Datt and Ravallion (1994) use an econometric model of time allocation and find that forgone earnings accounted for about 25% of the gross wage rate. By observational means—comparing workers on a similar scheme in Argentina with matched comparators—Jalan and Ravallion (2003) find that average forgone income was about 50% of the gross wage. In this context, however, we need the distribution of the net income gains.

### *Survey of workers on MGNREGS*

The methods of estimating forgone income from the literature reviewed above do not give us the distribution of the gains, so they do not allow us to simulate the allocation in equilibrium implied by the model in Section I. Dutta *et al.* (2014) designed a special-purpose survey that gives an estimate of forgone earnings for each worker. The survey was done in two rounds over 2009/10.<sup>12</sup>

The simulations implementing the model in Section I are possible only for the surveyed sample of existing workers under the scheme since the gains are observable only for this sample. This is clearly a selected sample, rather than being representative of rural India, or even rural Bihar. 75% of this sample of workers live in households with consumption per person below the World Bank’s international poverty line of \$1.90 a day, at 2011 purchasing

power parity.<sup>13</sup> This is well above the corresponding poverty rate for rural India in the same year, which was 36%. That said, the workers in the sample are not all ‘equally poor’. For example, the Gini index of household consumption per person among the surveyed workers is 0.27, which is only slightly lower than the corresponding Gini index for rural India at this time, 0.29 (Himanshu 2019).

The fact that this is a selected sample does not, of itself, reduce interest in these calculations. It is clearly of interest to know whether there is evidence of unexploited gains from trade within this sample of workers. However, in thinking about the policy implications, it should be noted that creating a market in BIK assignments can generate new incentives for participation. Section III returns to this issue in the context of the application studied here.

Surveyed MGNREGS workers were asked both to report their wages under the scheme and to estimate their forgone earnings, that is, how many days’ work they think they would have found and at what daily wage rate. In this setting, the participants are likely to have a good idea of their options. Dutta *et al.* (2014) find that the answers given accorded well with prevailing earnings from the casual (mostly part-time) work available at the time. Response rates to the questions on forgone earnings were high (92% and 98% in the two survey rounds). These questions were clearly no more difficult than the more familiar ‘objective’ questions. The most common response to the question on what activity would have been forgone was ‘casual labour’, which was the answer given by 42% of the respondents. This was casual manual work for a local landowner or some similar, relatively unskilled, non-farm work (18% of respondents gave ‘casual agricultural labour’ as their response, while 24% gave ‘casual non-agricultural labour’). ‘Work on own land’ was the next most common (23%), followed by ‘remain unemployed’ (19%) and ‘search for work’ (14%). Very few (0.3%) of the respondents said that they ‘don’t know’ what activity they would have been doing.

The survey allows us to measure only the *monetary* gain from obtaining a job on the scheme. For such poor people, the income gains will undoubtedly be prominent in decision-making about such a scheme. In principle, there may be non-pecuniary gains or losses. However, the work available on MGNREGS is manual labour that is very similar to the type of casual work normally available in this setting. So one would not expect much difference in non-pecuniary aspects related to the work itself. Possibly the fact that the MGNREGS work is for the government makes it more attractive, though that is a conjecture at best.

Thus, in this setting, we have credible self-reported data on the individual gains, as given by the actual earnings *less* forgone earnings (both reported). This is unusual; we rarely have data on the individual gains from social programmes, and aim only to estimate the mean gain. Furthermore, the gains are obviously known to participants, and it would seem reasonable to assume that they are the relevant gains from trade in assignments. (Since the survey asked actual participants, it is not likely that there would be an incentive to under-report forgone earnings to help gain access to the programme.) Table 1 provides summary statistics on the gains, expressed as a proportion of the overall mean wage rate.

There are three groups of participants. One reported no available work at the time; the second group expected work to be available that would have covered some non-negligible share (around half on average) of the time that they were working on the scheme; the third group reported on a small gain in extra work.<sup>14</sup> Figure 1 provides the kernel density functions for wage earnings from the scheme and forgone incomes (both normalized by days worked under the scheme). The variance in forgone income per day worked is 2.5 times greater than the variance in wage rates.<sup>15</sup>

TABLE 1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON MONETARY GAINS FROM PUBLIC WORKS JOBS IN BIHAR, INDIA

	Sample mean	Standard error	$N$
Gain	0.393	0.017	2307
Gain for workers in households with below-median consumption per person	0.436	0.024	1150
Gain for workers in households with above-median consumption per person	0.350	0.031	1151
Gain for female workers	0.363	0.031	669
Gain for male workers	0.406	0.020	1638
Gain for female workers in household with below-median consumption per person	0.435	0.047	315
Gain for male workers in household with below-median consumption per person	0.437	0.027	835
Gain for female workers in household with above-median consumption per person	0.299	0.037	352
Gain for male workers in household with above-median consumption per person	0.373	0.028	799

*Notes*

Mean gains (wage rate less forgone earnings) normalized by overall mean wage rate. 17 extreme values for the gains (exceeding 400% of mean wage rate) are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and scaled up by a factor of  $\sqrt{2}$  to allow for the re-surveying of individuals across rounds.




FIGURE 1. Kernel density functions for wages and forgone incomes on rural public works projects in Bihar, India. *Notes:* Kernel densities with bandwidth 0.25. Top/tail truncated at 2.5 (after estimation) to make the graph more readable.  $N = 2307$  after deleting 17 implausibly high outliers (exceeding 400 INR per day). Source: Author's calculations from the survey data collected in two rounds, 2009–10, by a team including the author and documented in Dutta *et al.* (2014) [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)].

*Simulations of the equilibrium and comparisons with policy options*

Applying the model of Section I, let  $W_i(1)$  denote the wage received by worker  $i$  when participating in the scheme, while  $W_i(0)$  is her forgone earnings while on the programme, so  $G_i = W_i(1) - W_i(0)$  for all  $i$ . In the simulations, a worker who receives an initial (random) assignment sells it if  $G_i < P$ , or (equivalently) she sells it if  $W_i(0) + P > W_i(1)$ .




FIGURE 2. Conditional mean gains ( $\widehat{E}(G_i|G_i > X)$ ). *Notes:* Gain from employment in MGNREGS. The gain is normalized by the overall mean wage rate (84.28 INR per day). Lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and scaled up by a factor  $\sqrt{2}$  to allow for the re-surveying of individuals across rounds.  $N = 2307$  after deleting 17 implausibly high outliers (exceeding 400 INR per day). Source: See Figure 1 [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)].

A worker who did not get assigned to the programme initially buys one if  $G_i > P$  (or, equivalently,  $W_i(1) - P > W_i(0)$ ). The value of  $P$  is then derived that clears the market.

The gain is measured by total wages received under the programme less forgone earnings, both normalized by the total days worked on the scheme.<sup>16</sup> Figure 2 plots the conditional means over the range of gains, that is,  $\varphi(X) \equiv \widehat{E}(G_i|G_i > X)$  for  $X \in [G^{\min}, G^{\max}]$ . (Some high values are dropped as the sample sizes become too small to be considered reliable.) To aid interpretation, the gain is expressed as a proportion of the overall sample mean wage rate (84.28 INR per day in 2009/10 prices). A key number to focus on for now is the sample mean gain,  $\bar{G} = 0.393$  (standard error 0.017,  $N = 2307$ ), meaning that the average gain from the existing assignment to the programme represents just under 40% of the mean wage rate. This is the status quo of the existing scheme, or, in expectation, the mean for a random subsample. We see that the conditional mean rises sharply once one includes the positives: ( $\widehat{E}(G_i|G_i \geq 0) = 0.393$  but  $\widehat{E}(G_i|G_i > 0) = 0.644$ ). In the positive range, the conditional mean rises roughly linearly with  $X$ .

The implied values of the equilibrium price and implied mean gains are found in Table 2 for selected coverage rates ranging from  $\bar{D} = 0.10$  to  $\bar{D} = 0.50$ . Recall that the equilibrium price is  $P = F^{-1}(1 - \bar{D})$ , that is, the value of gains below which one finds  $1 - \bar{D}$  of the workers.

We see that the equilibrium with tradable assignments yields substantially higher mean gains relative to the status quo. The average gains in Table 2 are 2–3 times higher (depending on the scale of the hypothetical programme). Naturally, the mean gain per participant rises as one reduces the overall coverage rate since the BIKs tend to be picked up by those with higher gains.

Turning to the ‘needs-based’ counterfactual, the obvious criterion is household consumption per person, as used for measuring poverty in India. In practice, this would probably be based on some form of proxy means test, as one would not have a survey-based consumption aggregate; so we would expect larger errors of targeting in reality.<sup>17</sup> Table 3 gives mean gains for the same coverage rates, but now assigning from the lowest consumption per person

TABLE 2  
MEAN GAINS FROM COMPETITIVELY TRADABLE ASSIGNMENTS

Coverage rate ( $\bar{D}$ ) (1)	Market clearing price ( $P$ ) (2)	Population share trading (3)	Mean gain for treated ( $\bar{E}(G_i   G_i > P)$ ) (4)	Mean gain for those below median consumption (5)	Share of consumption for below median household (6)	Mean gain for those above median consumption (7)	Mean gain for female workers (8)	Mean gain for male workers (9)
0.5	0.28	0.25	0.750 (0.018; 1154)	0.736 (0.024; 654)	0.217 (0.004; 654)	0.767 (0.028; 497)	0.757 (0.030; 312)	0.748 (0.030; 842)
0.4	0.47	0.24	0.845 (0.018; 920)	0.826 (0.024; 522)	0.363 (0.007; 522)	0.869 (0.030; 395)	0.827 (0.030; 262)	0.852 (0.023; 658)
0.3	0.60	0.21	0.952 (0.021; 677)	0.944 (0.027; 367)	0.463 (0.011; 367)	0.963 (0.030; 307)	0.931 (0.028; 190)	0.961 (0.025 487)
0.2	0.81	0.16	1.068 (0.023; 465)	1.059 (0.030; 249)	0.642 (0.020; 249)	1.078 (0.033; 214)	1.043 (0.025; 129)	1.078 (0.030; 336)
0.1	1.05	0.09	1.215 (0.033; 244)	1.217 (0.042; 126)	0.834 (0.038; 126)	1.214 (0.047; 117)	1.188 (0.018; 63)	1.225 (0.044; 181)

*Notes*

Mean gains normalized by overall mean wage rate. The status quo mean is 0.393 (s.e. 0.017). Equilibrium prices calculated numerically to nearest second decimal place. Share of consumption (column (6)) calculated for household of five people with one person selling an assignment for 20 days per month. Median consumption per person is 647 INR per month. Standard errors in parentheses, followed by subsample size. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and scaled up by a factor of  $\sqrt{2}$  to allow for the re-surveying of individuals across rounds.  
Source: See Figure 1.

TABLE 3  
MEAN GAINS FROM NEEDS-BASED VERSUS MARKET-BASED ASSIGNMENTS

Coverage rate ( $\bar{D}$ )	Cut-off point for consumption (INR/person/month)	Mean gain for needs-based allocation	Mean gain using market (Table 1)
0.5	646	0.436 (0.024; 1145)	0.750 (0.018; 1154)
0.4	580	0.438 (0.027; 925)	0.845 (0.018; 920)
0.3	515	0.453 (0.032; 682)	0.952 (0.021; 677)
0.2	447	0.468 (0.042; 463)	1.068 (0.023; 465)
0.1	372	0.472 (0.058; 230)	1.215 (0.033; 244)

*Notes*

Mean gains normalized by overall mean wage rate. The needs-based allocation goes to the poorest households based on consumption per person, with the cut-off determined by the coverage rate. Standard errors in parentheses, followed by subsample size. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and scaled up by a factor of  $\sqrt{2}$  to allow for the re-surveying of individuals across rounds.

Source: See Figure 1.

upwards until the coverage rate is met. (Table 3 also gives the required thresholds.) We see that the ‘poverty-based’ allocation achieves slightly higher mean gains than the actual mean ( $\bar{G} = 0.393$ ), but that it falls far short of the gains attainable with trade in equilibrium.

*Heterogeneity in the gains*

A key aspect of heterogeneity in this context is the extent of poverty. We see from Figure 3 that the conditional mean gains tend to fall with higher household consumption, although the (non-parametric) regression line is being pulled up at the bottom by a few outliers. It is clear, however, that the mean gains from the equilibrium assignment are no lower for those workers coming from households living below the median (see columns (5) and (7) of Table 2). The potential gains are spread through the distribution of living standards.

Gender differences are also of interest. 29% of the sampled workers are women. The overall mean gain is slightly lower for women. The relationship with household consumption is similar by gender, though the tendency for the gains to fall as household consumption per person rises tends to be less evident for women (Figure 3(b)). When one calculates mean gains separately by gender (conditional on gains exceeding the market clearing price), the differences are small at all levels of coverage (Table 2).

The gender split in Table 2 assumes a common market for both genders. Instead, one might split the market by gender (with trades allowed only among the same gender). This raises the market clearing price for men, and lowers it for women, while the aggregate gains are similar to those in Table 2. For example, at  $\bar{D} = 0.50$ , the equilibrium price rises to 0.31 for men and falls to 0.18 for women, with mean gains of 0.760 and 0.724, respectively. The population weighted mean gain across genders is 0.750 (Table 2).

### III. IMPEDIMENTS TO REALIZING THE GAINS IN PRACTICE

The evidence in the previous section is at least suggestive of large unexploited gains to poor people from trade in their BIK assignments. This points to the potential for policy intervention. A minimalist form of that intervention would be that the government does nothing to restrict trade. However, there are reasons why the gains from trade will still not be fully realized. The reasons relate to market and institutional impediments that also play



FIGURE 3. Gains plotted against household consumption per person. *Notes:* See Figure 2. Nearest-neighbour smoothed scatterplots. *Source:* See Figure 1 [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)].

a role in creating poverty in the first place. Realizing the potential gains from facilitating tradable assignments may require active public effort to facilitate and support the creation of a market, along with complementary policies to assure that poor people have access to that market.

Four main concerns can be identified. The first relates to credit-market imperfections, such that poor potential beneficiaries simply cannot afford to purchase a BIK assignment. Finding that the mean gains are no lower for poorer household does not, of course, imply that poor households who did not get an initial assignment could afford to buy one. Given liquidity constraints, the benefits may still be disproportionately captured by the relatively well off.

In support of this claim, Figure 4 gives the market price as a share of monthly consumption for a family of five. The cost rises to a (clearly) prohibitive share of consumption among poor families. Even the average shares for those living below the median are high; at a coverage rate of 0.5, the purchase cost is a little over 20% of consumption; it rises to over 80% at




FIGURE 4. Market price of assignments as a share of household consumption. *Notes:* Share of consumption calculated for a household of five people with one person selling an assignment for 20 days per month. Nearest-neighbour smoothed scatterplots. Source: See Figure 1 [Colour figure can be viewed at [wileyonlinelibrary.com](http://wileyonlinelibrary.com)].

a coverage rate of 0.1. (Column (6) of Table 2 gives the share of monthly consumption for those living below the median, and the standard errors.) Full payment of the market price up front could represent a prohibitively large share of consumption for poor households.

If a government-regulated market were introduced, then this liquidity-constraint problem could be solved by introducing a ‘pay-as-you-go’ option. One can anticipate resistance to such a step, as it might be interpreted as unequal (net) wages for the same work. That concern would need to be weighed against the potential benefits to poor workers in gaining access to the programme. Good communication would clearly be needed about the reasons for the deduction from wages (to cover the initial purchase of an assignment).

Second, there will be scope for less-liquidity-constrained non-poor people to participate in a new market for BIKs that strives to capture the unexploited gains from trade implied by this paper’s results. This is a concern, though it could also be addressed by policy design features. In the context of explicitly targeted programmes, one may want to maintain or even tighten existing eligibility criteria. The norm in antipoverty and other social programmes appears to be under-coverage of those deemed eligible, with rationing among the set of eligible participants.<sup>18</sup> While the results of this paper indicate large potential gains from trade among current participants, there would be new risks in expanding substantially the set of those eligible since the potential gains from trading assignments would attract more affluent participants not facing the same liquidity constraints on participating in the market.

A means of addressing this second concern in the context of self-targeted programmes is to introduce a minimum participation threshold and to facilitate trade in assignments only once that minimum is reached. While the self-targeting mechanism tends to discourage participation by the well-off, creating the market option could well impact selection into the programme—attracting ‘speculators’ and middlemen who do not intend to work, but will only re-sell their assignment if they get one. However, one can avoid this by requiring a sufficiently long initial period of work before re-sale is available as an option.

Third, there may well be social frictions in the flow of knowledge. Dutta *et al.* (2014) also survey participants’ knowledge about MGNREGS. Most of the sample had heard of the scheme, but knowledge about the scheme’s rules and provisions was poor, especially for women. The above calculations may overstate gains to women relative to men. Realizing the benefits from trade clearly requires that participants are reasonably well-informed about their

personal gains, and that they know how to access the market. Presumably, creating a market for BIK assignments would change the incentives for seeking and spreading information on the scheme. Even so, information dissemination efforts would probably be needed, to complement a switch to tradable assignments in social programmes.

There is evidence from the same setting that external intervention through ‘infotainment’ can enhance individual knowledge about this programme and (hence) the individual gains. Ravallion *et al.* (2015) report results from their RCT using an entertaining movie (produced for this purpose) to teach people their rights and the rules and administrative procedures under the scheme. The movie did enhance knowledge when assessed by a quiz given before and after seeing the movie, and especially so for women. However, in studying the impacts of this RCT, Alik-Lagrange and Ravallion (2019) find evidence of social frictions on information dispersal within villages—frictions that disadvantage lower-caste and poorer individuals. Effort would be needed to advertise widely the scope for mutually beneficial trades in assignments.

The fourth concern is whether the administrative capacity will be present in poor places to implement an efficient, largely corruption-free, secondary market in BIK assignments. This is no small matter. MGNREGS does have a quite sophisticated (public-access) web-based information system, and it would seem plausible that the software to support a market for assignments could also be developed, preferably integrated with the existing information system.<sup>19</sup> However, what actually happens on the ground could deviate appreciably from the programme’s formal operating rules. Dutta *et al.* (2014) identify a number of administrative performance problems in poor areas of India that make it hard for the scheme studied here to attain its potential impact on poverty even without tradable assignments. These features can also be thought of as institutional failures that help to create poverty in the first place. Of course, enhancing public administrative capacity is an important element of development policy more broadly—a channel that is relevant to the efficacy of a wide range of policies.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Given the limitations of poverty targeting efforts in practice—limitations stemming in large part from asymmetric information—a policy reform that allows people to trade their initial assignments of benefits-in-kind in antipoverty programmes can, in principle, enhance their impact on poverty. Indeed, under ideal conditions, the subsequent competitive equilibrium will attain the maximum impact with perfect information even when the decision-maker is ignorant of the individual gains. At the same time, the existence of asymmetric private information is clearly one of the reasons why we know so little about how much scope there may be for poor people to gain from trade in assignments. In situations in which governments strive to prevent trade in assignments, and have the power to do so, this also means that we know rather little about the welfare costs of such restrictions.

This also has implications for how we interpret evaluative evidence on the impacts of antipoverty programmes. Randomized controlled trials need not yield valid inferences about equilibrium assignments since the latter will not (in general) be random. Nor do these methods provide valid inferences when restrictions on the re-sale of benefits in kind are enforceable only in scaled-up programmes.

Based on a theoretical model of a competitive market for assignments, this paper has offered some evidence on the gains from trade in assignments to a large antipoverty programme in a poor state in rural India. The programme aims to reduce poverty by providing jobs on labour-intensive public works projects. A novel feature of the setting is that it is feasible to use surveys to measure individual pecuniary gains from the jobs provided, even though this information is unlikely to be available for implementing a scheme of transferable

in-kind benefits. The surveyed workers were asked about both actual wages received and labour-market options at the time. Thus we have an estimate of the distribution of the gains, not just the mean. And we have the joint distribution of the gains and other characteristics of the worker and household. Informed by a theoretical model of the equilibrium with tradable assignments, the paper has used these novel data to simulate various stylized schemes, at different levels of coverage. Thus the paper has been able to measure the extent of the unexploited gains from trade in this setting and to study their incidence by household levels of living and the gender of workers.

These calculations have required an unusual dataset, providing self-reports on the individual earnings gains from the programme; specifically, I require the distribution (indeed joint distribution) of the gains, not just an estimate of their mean. It is clearly too early to draw external inferences for other types of programmes, such as food BIKs. However, it would seem fair to say that the results of this paper support further investigation of this policy option in other contexts.

The calculations indicate that there are large unexploited gains to poor people from trade in assignments. A competitive market for tradable assignments would generate aggregate gains that are orders-of-magnitude greater than the current mean gains to these (mostly very poor) families. Tradable assignments would also have far greater impact (by a similar magnitude in terms of mean gains) to an allocation without the re-sale option that is targeted to workers from consumption-poor families. Facilitating tradable assignments in this setting can also make workfare more effective against poverty than various options for (budget-neutral) cash transfers.

The results do not suggest that the potential gains from the market-based assignment would tend to favour more affluent families. The mean gains were very similar between the poorest half, in terms of household consumption per person, and the rest. Indeed, the simulated allocations with tradable assignments imply a tendency for somewhat larger gains among poorer households, not the opposite. Gains are similar between male and female workers.

The paper has pointed to some likely impediments to realizing the gains from trade, including credit market failures, capture by non-poor speculators, and imperfect information. There are complementary policies that may well be needed. A ‘pay-as-you-go’ option could help to address liquidity constraints stemming from credit market imperfections. Eligibility criteria and minimum participation requirements (to encourage self-targeting) could help to dissuade non-poor speculators and middlemen from entering the market. And information campaigns are clearly desirable, and not so hard to do. Limitations on local-level administrative capacity and the (related) scope for corruption also warn for caution. The same features impede many other aspects of economic development. As is often the case, success in one policy effort—in this case assuring that the potential benefits to poor people of an antipoverty programme are fully realized in practice—may require success on multiple fronts.

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#### NOTES

1. On the rationales for in-kind benefits, see Moffitt (2006) and Currie and Gahvari (2008). Discussions of the policy choice between cash and in-kind benefits include Akerlof (1978), Coate (1989), Currie and Gahvari (2008), Cunha (2014) and Hirvonen and Hoddinott (2021).

2. In the context of targeting based on the ‘poverty proxies’ typically available in practice, see Brown *et al.* (2018), using data for multiple countries in Africa. In the context of efforts to encourage in-kind consumption of food, see Cunha (2014), using data for Mexico.
3. See, for example, Rubin (2005).
4. This specific information asymmetry is an example of what Heckman *et al.* (2006) call ‘essential heterogeneity’.
5. Stability is assured under the usual condition that the price rises with excess demand, and falls with excess supply.
6. The term in  $\bar{D}(1 - \bar{D})P$  drops out as it is a pure transfer between groups 2 and 3.
7. Note that randomized assignment implies that  $E(G_i|D_i = 0, G_i > P) = E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i > P)$  (given that randomization assures that the assignment is uncorrelated with the potential individual gains). Also note that  $E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i > P) > E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i < P)$ . Thus  $E(G_i|D_i = 0, G_i > P) > E(G_i|D_i = 1, G_i < P)$ .
8. On the incentive arguments for workfare versus cash transfers, see Besley and Coate (1992). Alik-Lagrange and Ravallion (2018) generalize the theoretical model of Besley and Coate to allow for both unemployment and a welfare loss associated with the work requirement.
9. Under the formal rules, the state government can relax this, although that seems to be rare.
10. The recorded days worked may exceed 100 in the dataset due to differences in the definition of the household between the survey and the scheme, as well as measurement errors such as recall on when the work was done.
11. Evidence of rationing is also reported by Ravallion *et al.* (1993) for the antecedent programmes to MGNREGS, in the state of Maharashtra.
12. Workers’ surveys in the two rounds are pooled, but standard errors are adjusted upwards by  $\sqrt{2}$  to allow for re-surveying the same workers in different rounds. Since not all were re-surveyed, this adjustment is conservative.
13. The consumption aggregate used here follows the same methods as for India’s National Sample Survey.
14. Further details can be found in Murgai *et al.* (2016), which provides density functions for the ratio of forgone days and wages to the days and wages provided by the scheme. Three modes are indicated, corresponding to these three groups of workers.
15. Wages are fixed on a piece-rate basis for most jobs, but this still generates a variance in the wages received per unit time. The variance in wages is 44% of the variance in gains, while the variance in forgone incomes is 110% of the variance in gains. The positive covariance ( $\times 2$ ) accounts for the rest.
16. There are lags in actual wage receipts (Dutta *et al.* 2014, ch. 4). I include wages owed. There were some cases where forgone earnings exceeded wages received (or owed). These were treated as measurement errors (probably reflecting some misunderstanding of the survey question); the net gain was then set to zero.
17. See, for example, Brown *et al.* (2018).
18. For an overview of evidence on this point, see Ravallion (2017).
19. The existing information system does not record the extent of rationing under the scheme. Under the scheme’s rules, the state government is responsible for paying an unemployment allowance if work cannot be found. This gives the state government a strong incentive to report that all requests for work were honoured. That is inconsistent with what has been observed based on surveys (Dutta *et al.* 2012, 2014; Desai *et al.* 2015).

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